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SCOTTISH MIGRATION- PROSPECTS FOR THE NINETIES 
Isobel Lindsay 
Both ecological concerns and demographic trends have stimulated 
interest in population issues. In particular the implications of zero population 
growth have been of increasing concern(!). In Scotland's case we have moved 
beyond zero growth into actual population decline and there are no reasons to 
assume that the factors which have produced that decline will alter 
spontaneously. This raises a wide range of public policy issues. Is the impact of 
these demographic trends positive or negative for Scottish society? If it is 
negative, are there policy initiatives which could modify these population 
factors? If we cannot expect to change trends, what are the implications for the 
labour market and the economy? What do we know about the motivation to 
migrate? We are currently in the familiar situation of waiting for social change 
to overtake us rather than anticipating its direction. 
First what are the population changes which have taken place in Scotland 
and how are these developments likely to proceed in the nineties and beyond? 
The following illustrates the major changes in Scotland's population history 
since the mid-19th century. [See Table 1] 
The one outstanding factor is the extent and consistency of population 
loss through out-migration. This is one of the most distinctive features of 
Scottish· society. There has been no recorded period in which Scotland has had 
other than a loss from migration, peaking at 390,000 in 1921-31 and reaching its 
second highest level in 1961-71. The second factor of interest is the 
traditionally high birth rate which enabled a slow but steady population growth 
to be maintained despite migration loss until the 1970's. Table 2 illustrates the 
change in Scotland's position in comparison with other parts of the UK. 
Having had a higher fertility rate than England and Wales, the early eighties 
saw this fall to a level lower than theirs. 
Migration loss in the context of high birth rates and continuing population 
growth is 'disguised'. When it is clearly identified as the cause of population 
decline, its significance increases. This decline in Scotland's birth rate is 
broadly in line with trends in most industrially advanced countries. Although 
now slightly lower than England and Wales, Scotland's birth rate is still higher 
than most Western European countries. Despite this there is only one other 
Western European country which has gone into population decline and that is 
the Irish Regublic. The Scottish population is officially projected to go down 
to 4,999,000 2) by 2001, a fall of95,000 between 1988-2001. In the same period 
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TABLE 1: Intercensal and annual changes in births, deaths and migration 
and their effect on population, Scotland 1861 to 1981 and 1971 to 1988 
(thousands) 
Changes affecting population 
Period Population Population Estimated net civilian migration 
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1,004.9 652.5 352.4 -390.0 -330.0 - 60.0 - 1.9 
1,849.3 1,347.0(1)502.3 -220.0 -210.0 - 10.0 -28.9 
958.6 619.3 339.3 -282.0 -140.0 -142.0 25.6 
975.0 628.7 346.3 -326.5 -169.0 -157.5 29.9 
6%.7 638.1 58.6 -151.2 - 52.1 - 99.1 - 5.7 
Annual changes in estimated population 
83.0 64.2 18.8 - 28.6 - 14.8 - 13.8 4.8 
76.3 64.0 12.4 - 11.7 4.0 7.7 2.6 
71.0 64.2 6.8 - 3.0 5.0 8.0 3.1 
69.3 64.8 4.6 - 20.0 - 4.0 - 16.0 7.0 
67.6 64.9 2.7 - 5.8 0.4 5.4 4.1 
62.1 63.2 1.1 - 10.8 4.3 6.5 4.7 
63.1 64.2 1.0 - 17.3 7.6 - 9.7 4.4 
Continued next page 
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TABLE 1 continued 




































Changes affecting population 
Estimated net civilian migration 
Births Deaths Natural Other 
changes increase Remainderor 
Total U.K. Overseas 
Annual changes in estimated population 
66.8 65.0 1.8 - 14.6 7.1 7.5 4.1 
68.5 64.2 4.3 - 16.3 9.9 6.4 2.3 
69.4 62.8 6.6 - 23.1 5.0 - 18.1 2.8 
67.2 65.8 1.5 - 14.9 0.9 - 14.0 - 0.2 
65.8 63.9 1.8 - 17.8 5.0 - 12.8 - 0.2 
64.3 62.9 1.4 - 9.1 9.0 0.1 3.0 
66.1 62.4 3.7 - 12.6 9.7 2.9 - 0.3 
66.8 65.2 1.6 - 16.1 - 11.5 4.6 - 1.0 
66.0 61.2 4.7 - 15.0 - 11.4 3.6 1.4 
66.9 62.0 4.9 - 24.7 - 17.1 7.6 - 1.7 
Notes: (1) Includes estimated war deaths of non-civilians and merchant seamen abroad 
(74,00Q in 1914-18 and 34,000 in 1939-45). 
Registrar General Scotland, Annual Report 1988 
England should increase by over 2 million, Wales by 120,000 and Northern 
Ireland by over 70,000. 
There is no room for dogmatic certainty about the future trend of birth 
rates but there are reasonable assumptions. Lower child-bearing is probably 
linked to the broadening of women's aspirations and opportunities and 
improved access to birth control. With higher levels of participation by women 
in the labour market and in higher education, the trend towards lower birth 
rates is likely to be strengthened rather than weakened. It appears that a low 
natural increase in population, possibly falling to zero natural growth is the 
pattern we can expect in the richer countries. There may be a period in the 
1990s in Scotland when birth rates rise slightly because of the higher 
proportion of women in the child-bearing age range but this will be a 
temporary factor. 
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TABLE 2: General fertility rate: live births per 1000 women aged 15-44, 






















































































Notes: 1. Figures for 1900-1905. 
2. Estimated from Eire figures to be comparable with later years. 
3. Excludes 1908. 
Sources: OPCS, Birth Statistics, Series FM1, no.1, Table 1.16, 1974; 
OPCS,Birth Statistics, Series FM1, no.7, Table 1.161980; 
OPCS, Birth Statistics, Series FM1, no.12, Table 1.16 1985; 
Registrar-General, Scotland, Annual Reports for relevant years up to 1930; 
no.114 (1968) Part II (Population and Vital Statistics) Table Sl.6); no.l17 
(1971) Part II (Population and Vital Statistics) Table Sl.5; no.126 (1980) 
Table Sl.5; Table S2.1 in Annual Reports no.127 (1981), no.l28 (1982), 
no.129 (1983), no.l30 (1984) and no.l31 (1985); · 
CSO, Annual Abstract of Statistics, No. 84 (1935-46) to date; 
Registrar-General Northern Ireland, Annual Report, no.59, Table C1 and E; 
no.60, Table C1 and E; no.61, Table C1; no.62, Table C1 and El. 
British Social Trends since 1900, Ed. A.H. Halsey. 1988. 
It is migration loss which has produced Scotland's historically low 
population growth and her current population decline. Were that loss spread 
evenly over the population as a whole, it would still be highly significant. But it 
is concentrated in certain sections of the population ·and this makes its impact 
greater. Apart from some cases of forced migration, migratory behaviour 
generally involves young adults. [See Table 3]. 
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TABLE 3: Estimated net migration, by sex and age, Scotland, 
















- 2,020 - 1,840 
- 8,500 - 7,100 
- 2,720 - 1,890 
+ 100 + 320 
+ 350 + 300 
-12,790 -10,210 
Notes: 1. "Net migration" means the difference between total emigration and total 
immigration and includes "other changes". 
2. A+ sign signifies a net gain; a- sign a net loss. 
Registrar General Scotland Annual Report 1988 
Of Scottish migratory losses in 1988, 68% were in the 15-29 age range. In 
contrast, among the elderly there is a small net gain from migration which we 
might expect would increase since it is the section of the population which is 
growing most rapidly. Despite the disproportionate loss of the young through 
migration, Scotland's proportion of the retired is lower than the UK average 
because we also have the highest death rate in Western Europe, possibly an 
economic advantage but one whose desirability is questionable. 
The areas of loss are also of interest since they are not evenly spread 
throughout Scotland. [See Table 4]. 
The 'new' Glasgow still has a disproportionate share of the out-migration 
from Scotland. With less than 20% of the population, Greater Glasgow had 
over 30% of the net migration loss at national level in 1987-8. The case of the 
Highlands is particularly interesting in that it now has a small net population 
gain from migration from other parts of Scotland and from elsewhere, a 
development to which we shall return. The high loss from Grampian in that 
year is almost certainly oil-related. Grampian has gained population from both 
internal and external migration during the 70s and the early 80s. The sharp 
downturn in oil activity in the mid 80s has put this trend into reverse. 
We do not have the information on the occupational categories which 
make up the migration loss but we can draw certain conclusions from 
developments in UK and international labour markets. In the past there was a 
demand for skilled and semi-skilled male manual workers as well as for those 
with higher education. There was also a less prohibitive housing market in 
many areas of high labour demand in the UK. Until the 1970's a number of 
overseas countries not only had an open-door policy for the healthy and 
employable, they were still pursuing an active recruitment strategy. Australia, 
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TABLE4: Estimated net migration, by destination, to region and health 
board area, Scotland, year ending 30 June 1988 
Area Total net Within Scotland Outside Scotland 
SCOTLAND -23,000 - 0 -23,000 
Region- Health board Area 
Borders + 720 + 810 - 90 
Central (Forth Valley HBA) - 850 + 470 - 1,320 
Dumfries & Galloway + 510 + 170 + 340 
Fife - 260 + 590 - 850 
Grampian - 2,730 +840 - 3,570 
Highland + 1,100 + 270 + 830 
Lothian - 3,420 - 670 - 2,750 
Strathclyde -18,370 -3,420 -14,950 
Tayside + 320 +1,110 - 790 
Orkney + 110 - 40 + 150 
Shetland - 130 - 10 - 120 
Western Isles - 0 - 120 + 120 
Strathclyde Health Areas 
Argyll & Clyde HBA - 1,700 +340 - 2,040 
Aryshire & Arran HBA - 530 +1,200 - 1,730 
Greater Glasgow HBA -12,140 -4,600 - 7,540 
Lanarkshire HBA - 4,000 - 360 - 3,640 
Notes: 1. "Net migration" means the difference between total emigration and total 
immigration and includes "other changes". 
2. A + sign signifies a net gain; a - sign a net loss. 
Registrar General, Scotland, Annual Report 1988. 
opportunities even for people who did not have high qualifications. The 
situation over the past twenty years has changed. Overseas countries have 
faced their own unemployment problems since the recession of the early 1970's 
and their only labour shortages are in specific skilled categories. They are now 
very highly selective in the applicants they accept. In England, as elsewhere, 
demand for the semi-skilled male manual worker has sharply declined and in 
areas of higher labour demand there are serious shortages of low-cost housing. 
As a result recent migration has had little to offer the less skilled unless they 
are spouses moving with partners in higher occupational categories. We 
cannot assume from this that the low skilled do not migrate. London's 
'cardboard city' produces evidence that they do. Centrepoint, the charity 
seeking to aid the homeless, has estimated that 20% of the young who sleep 
rough in London are Scots<3l. But this is not mainstream migration. In the 
rational calculation of advantages and disadvantages, it is now only the highly 
qualifed who can expect to gain. 
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The effect of migration loss is not, therefore, just a numerical one but a 
qualitative one. Our losses are concentrated among the young and the skilled. 
Net out-migration shows no sign of diminishing. Although it declined after the 
peak post-war period of 1961-71, this would appear to have been caused more 
by decline in migration opportunity than in migration demand. The 1978-88 
loss was 164,000 and while the official projected loss for the 1990's is 13,000 per 
annum, the loss of 24,700 in 1987-88 suggests that this may be an 
underestimate. If the external demand increases, it would be reasonable to 
expect that Scotland's migration loss will increase. 
We have seen the effect of migration loss on Scotland's overall 
population. When we look specifically at the labour market, those sections of 
the population in employment or actively seeking work, the significance of 
migration may be increasing. The Labour Force Survey<4l estimates that 
Scotland will have the highest percentage drop in the UK in the number of 
under-25s in the labour force- a decline of 29% between 1988 and 2000. This 
could be higher if migration losses do turn out to be greater than current 
projections. While other regions will experience a reduction in the younger 
age group, most will continue to see an increase in the overall size of their 
labour force up till the end of the century. The decline in birth rates will take 
time to work through and for a period will be more than compensated for by 
the increase in the number of older workers and the higher participation rate of 
women. Increases in the size of the labour force are expected to be as large as 
14% in South-West England, 13% in East Anglia, with the East Midlands 
rising by 7% and the South-East by 6%. But it is estimated that Scotland, 
together with the North and North-West will experience a steady and 
immediate decline in the overall labour force, even with higher female 
participation rates. While the relatively greater fall in the Scottish birth rate 
will be a contributory factor to these changes, it is principally migration which 
is the determining variable. 
The decline in the number of young adults entering the labour market is 
likely to become a problem in most industrially advanced countries and this 
will coincide with an increasing demand for skilled labour. There is an 
estimated increase of one million jobs in the UK between 1987-95 in 
professional and related jobs(5l. The Scottish Council (Development and 
Industry) has calculated that an increase of 100,000 jobs in Scotland is likely 
with substantial increase in demand for those with higher educational 
qualifications<6l. Were these factors of increasing demand for skilled labour 
together with decreasing supply applicable to Scotland alone, we might expect 
this to produce a marked decline in migration. But, of course, these factors 
which apply to Scotland are also in evidence in other parts of the UK and 
abroad. We can expect improved job opportunities in Scotland for the well-
qualified young and, indeed, for the less qualified also, but this will take place 
in the context of better job opportunities elsewhere. Since 'elsewhere' is very 
much larger than Scotland, the range of attractive jobs with good career 
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greatest depression which have produced the highest levels of Joss but periods 
of increasing opportunities, for example, during the 50's and 60's. The effect of 
these changes on the Jess skilled may be more complex. It will depend on the 
extent to which the female participation rate can be increased and on the 
prospects for using more older workers in routine service jobs. Labour-saving 
technology may be an option in some occupations but it does not provide an 
obvious solution in much service employment. So employment opportunities 
ought to improve but to a Jesser extent than for the skilled. There would have 
to be major increases in regional earnings differentials and in low-cost housing 
provision to make migration to other parts of the UK a more attractive option 
for those with few qualifications. 
What we can expect, therefore, are conflicting pressures. On the one 
hand there ought to be more job opportunities in Scotland with improved 
conditions because of the greater competition for the available labour. On the 
other hand the demand in other parts of the UK and abroad will also be higher. 
The attractions are not purely financial. They include the range of work 
available, the prospects for career development, the attractiveness of the 
environment in which people will live and work. It is not possible to predict 
where this balance of conflicting pressures will settle. Better job prospects in 
Scotland might be expected to reduce migration but increased prospects 
elsewhere could increase it. An Industry Department for Scotland discussion 
paper<7l commented: " .... given the better employment prospects generally for 
graduates remaining in Scotland, there may be less of an exodus of Scottish 
domiciled graduates going south to find employment, and an opportunity 
exists for Scottish employers to capture more of those graduating in Scotland. 
By the same token, however, there is a risk that very acute shortages elsewhere 
may result in enhanced outflows from Scotland." The capacity to hold Scottish 
graduates will be a Earticularly testing one. Scottish graduate migration has 
always been high< l. Evidence suggests that Scotland was losing out 
increasingly in the 80's in graduate employment. The Labour Force Survey<9l 
estimated that in 1983 Scotland had 9.4% of the British graduate population in 
employment. By 1987 this was 7%, that is 14,000 fewer despite little change in 
the total numbers in employment in Scotland. Over this period the number of 
graduates working in Britain went up by 283,000 and the numbers increased or 
remained static in every other region. Of Glasgow Universi~'s Scottish 
domiciled 1988 graduates, 33% left Scotland for their first job<1 • The 1988 
figure for Strathclyde University was over 40%. The overwhelming majority 
went to England. These figures almost certainly understate the proportion of 
Scottish graduates who will eventually make their principal place of work 
outside Scotland. Although some migrant graduates will come back, more are 
likely to go in second or subsequent jobs. In a historical study of Aberdeen 
graduate migration from 1860-1960, more graduates were found to be working 
outside Scotland in their last reported job than in their first, particularly the 
number overseas was higher<II)_ Graduates are, therefore, already a highly 
migration-prone group and given the central importance of knowledged-based 
investment in modern economic development, the ability to hold a substantial 
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pool of graduate labour is likely to be critical. 
Apart from this direct impact on the labour market, other effects of 
migration-produced population decline are economic and ecological. The 
overall economic effects of migration loss and population decline are not 
simple to assess. There are positive and negative aspects. The labour market 
effects are not entirely negative. They may create some problems for 
employers but they will strengthen the position of employees. Employers may 
increasingly have to respect and value their workers more and use their skills 
with care. The other economic implications involve public investment, growth 
implications, and entrepreneurial effects. 
There is a real and long-standing Joss to Scottish society in investing 
heavily in education, health and welfare services for young people who then 
leave in the economically active period of their lives. Receiving countries gain 
well-educated, healthy, economically-active young people with no investment 
cost. They gain them at a period when they can be expected to make a very 
positive contribution to the economy, to be a source of tax revenue, and to cost 
little in terms of use of social services. There is no evidence of any significant 
'remittance' tradition among Scottish migrants transferring resources back to 
Scotland, a process typical of many migratory groups. This economic 
disadvantage is compounded if people come back to Scotland at a much later 
stage in their lives or if there is in-migration by other older age-groups. To a 
modest extent this is happening. If it increases, it could be economically 
expensive and Scotland would be losing out in public investment terms at both 
ends of the life-cycle. Those migrants who have gone abroad are a straight Joss. 
Those who have gone to England are partially an accounting loss. Because of 
unitary central taxation, some of the investment is not paid specifically by 
Scotland but will be attributed as public investment in Scotland. But services 
paid for by local taxation are a direct Joss. This is not trivial when you consider 
the net Joss of 836,000 since 1951 and the fact that the educational profile of 
these migrants has been higher than average. Well-qualified people have been 
one of Scotland's most buoyant exports but one from whom there has been 
little return. If it is assumed that high unemployment is endemic in the Scottish 
economy, then it might be argued that the safety valve of migration reduces the 
public expenditure costs of unemployment. However, since those who are 
leaving are likely to be the well-qualified, the impact on unemployment if they 
had stayed would not necessarily have been a simple numerical one. 
The entrepreneurial deficit created by migration is an intriguing but 
highly speculative factor. Scotland has a low rate of new business start-ups<12l. 
This is particularly the case in those regions of greatest migration Joss but the 
connection is likely to be an indirect one. This is a problem which has probably 
no single explanation. Almost by definition, many of those who migrate 
considerable distances require higher levels of initiative and a preparedness 
for some risk-taking. Given that most are now likely to have higher than 
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in other circumstances to produce candidates for entrepreneurial activity. As 
long as migration is readily available as a route to advancement and one 
sanctioned by tradition and common usage, it may deplete the pool of the 
enterprising young. Looked at on a year-to-year basis this might not seem a 
significant contributory factor. If you take a longer-term perspective the 
figures become more striking; a net loss of almost two million this century; of 
836,000 since 1951; and of 165,000 between 1978-88. These are big figures for a 
small country. The least one can say about migration loss and the 
entrepreneurial deficit is that it has not helped. We cannot be sure how much it 
has hindered. 
The general impact of population decline on economic development has 
not been a popular area of contemporary economic analysis for the obvious 
reason that there have been few economies for which it has been a problem. 
Some of the more relevant work has been on zero growth or declining 
population growth rather than actual reduction, especially reduction produced 
by migration. Most countries are still experiencing population growth and are 
likely to go on doing so into the next century, although at a reduced rate. In 
theory the same GDP can be generated by and divided among a smaller 
population and the overall level of demand may be unaffected although there 
may be sectoral implications. "The problem of the cessation of population 
growth is basically one of adjustment to a new economic environment which 
needs to be more capital intensive"<13l. This would need to apply even more so 
when we are dealing with population decline. In practice this is likely to be 
more complex. A rising population provides an automatic stimulus to the 
economy, other things being equal, and the decline in both the labour force 
and total population puts this into reverse unless there is increased investment 
or other economic changes. 
The one aspect of population decline which is the most positive is the 
ecological. The days of associating national prestige and well-being with 
population size have almost passed. The 'cost' of people has started to figure 
fairly highly in the current economic pressures facing governments. Waste 
disposal costs, atmospheric pollution, transport congestion, housing and land 
shortages - these diminish the attractions of rising population. In this respect 
Scotland is well-placed, ironically so, in that the principal reason for our very 
favourable ratio of land to people is our historically high migration losses. It is 
an asset whose advantages are not fully realised because of the very uneven 
distribution of population, with 80% concentrated in a third of the land area. 
This is particularly so since under-population has its own economic costs. 
Nevertheless, space is now one of Scotland's most important assets - or 
potential assets. If our population remained static or grew very slowly, this 
would not diminish our environmental advantages vis-a-vis other areas. 
Further population decline is unlikely to contribute much ecological 
advantage in Scotland's case. Also migration-led population decline in 
comparison with that occurring from birth/death rate changes, involves highly 
selective losses. 
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Having looked at some of the implications of migration loss, the balance 
sheet appears to be a negative one. The most positive factor is the ecological, 
but falling birth rates are starting to produce low to zero growth in any case. 
Migration as an unemployment solution will be less important in the coming 
years with fewer entrants into the labour market unless there is major 
recession. In this respect it has always had the disadvantage of disguising the 
extent of the problem and thus reducing the pressure to find solutions other 
than the export of labour. Of course there can be very positive aspects to 
migration if it is roughly in balance. Experience out of Scotland may be a 
source of fresh ideas and stimulation but only if there is early return migration 
or sufficient in-migration in comparable social categories. But for Scotland 
neither the return migration or the in-migration has been sufficient at any time 
to cover the losses. 
If the effects of out -migration are generally negative for Scottish society, 
the question arises as to whether migration patterns can be changed and 
whether anything can be done through public policy initiatives. In theory 
migration is one of the demographic variables which can change quickly. 
There is no inherent reason why the officially projected loss of 130,000 during 
the 1990's could not turn into a gain. Even if losses were reduced to around 
3,000 per annum, this could secure zero growth not decline. Birth-rate changes 
are long-term in their effect and complex in the factors influencing them. 
Death rates are not within anyone's control in the short-term and possibly not 
in the long-term either. But migration is generally a conscious decision by an 
adult to move or to stay after weighing up the options. Because of the high 
level of rationality which is involved, the decision ought to be comparatively 
straight-forward to influence. But is it? Can Governments influence such 
decisions? Scottish historical experience must prove daunting to any optimistic 
expectation about reducing or reversing migration loss. Scotland has 
experienced that loss with remarkable consistency since records began and 
probably long before that. We cannot look to any period and say things were 
different. We can point to periods of greater or lesser loss but these seem to be 
related more strongly not to changes in demand but to changes in the supply of 
external opportunities. 
We need to have more understanding of motivation before we can 
attempt informed judgements about what might alter behaviour. While 
people's conscious interpretation of their motivation may not reveal all the 
factors influencing their decisions, it is an important starting point in 
understanding what is influential. This is one of the great under-researched 
areas in 20th century Scottish society. There is little material on motivation in 
distance migration. Indeed the whole area of modern migration has aroused 
little interest, perhaps because it has been one of the great 'taken for granted' 
aspects of Scottish society. Also it was not such a visible problem. Immigrants 
who are culturally distinctive are a visible phenomenon and have been 
regarded in England as a highly relevant research area. But the absent tend to 
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be less of a perceived problem except when depopulation becomes so marked 
that it threatens community breakdown. Depopulation for most of Scotland 
was not an obvious problem since, until recently, high birth rates kept the 
population growing slowly. There has normally been an excess supply of 
labour and a shortage of adequate housing (a severe shortage for most of the 
century), therefore the problem could be perceived as one of having too many 
people. There has been the additional difficulty of studying those who left. By 
definition they are dispersed and it is difficult to get access to an appropriate 
population. 
Concern about graduate migration offered an opportunity to reach an 
appropriate population of Scottish migrants in order to examine these 
questions of motivation. As one part of a wider study of graduate migration, 
we tried to reach a number of Scottish graduates who had moved overseas. 
Strathclyde University's alumni relations programme distributes a magazine 
to former graduates. Five thousand of these go overseas and cover all 
graduates for whom there are addresses. These include a large number of 
graduates who were not originally Scottish domiciled but the proportion of 
these on the distribution list was unknown. Strathclyde has had a regular 
inflow of students from Scandinavia, the Far and Middle East and from 
England but the logistical problems of excluding those whom it was considered 
might not have been originally Scottish were too great and could not have been 
entirely accurate. A questionnaire was included in the magazine mailing to all 
five thousand with a request that only those who were originally of Scottish 
domicile should reply. Given the problems of that type of mailing reaching its 
destination and being opened, together with the numbers who would not have 
been originally domiciled, it is probably optimistic to expect that 50% reached 
a relevant population. There were 214 valid responses from 44 countries. A 
number of others came mistakenly from graduates who had not been 
domiciled in Scotland. It is intended to repeat this exercise with a sample of 
graduates from other parts of the UK and there is also currently a survey of 
third-year undergraduates. The questions most immediately relevant to 
conscious motivation were those asking about the principal reasons for moving 
out of Scotland, the principal reasons forremaining out of Scotland, and desire 
and likelihood of returning. Respondents were obviously a biased group in 
that they do not include graduates who left Scotland for a period and then 
returned. That bias may be somewhat countered by the fact that they have 
enough of a continuing interest in a country which many of them left a 
considerable number of years ago to read an alumni magazine and reply to a 
questionnaire. 
Although replies were received from a large number of countries, they 
were heavily weighted towards three, very much in line with patterns of 
Scottish migration. Twenty-five per cent came from Canada, 21% from the 
United States and 11% from Australia. Twenty-one per cent were from 12 
European countries, West Germany and Switzerland being the two best 
represented. It is generally assumed that motivation for migration is primarily 
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economic and one of the key points of interest was to get some (inevitably 
rather crude) indication of the extent to which this was true. Respondents were 
asked to select in order of importance the factors which influenced their 
decision to leave. Forty-seven per cent selected work opportunities as the main 
reason influencing their decision to go abroad. Of these only a small 
proportion, 9%, suggested that the problem was difficulty in getting a job in 
Scotland. The majority, 59%, indicated that it was getting a job with 
appropriate career prospects which was important and 17% said it was getting 
work which was more financially rewarding. It would appear that for those 
leaving primarily for work reasons, it is the quality of employment and the 
perceived scope for career development which were the most important 
aspects. Twenty-nine per cent of respondents selected 'to broaden horizons' as 
their principal reason for migrating. It was an expression which almost a third 
of the sample identified with as the primary motivating factor in their decision 
to leave Scotland. Only one other reason was important: 11% gave 'family or 
other social relationships' as their reason for leaving, another non-economic 
factor. Only a few (3%) gave money as their main reason for migrating. 
The pattern of responses shifts significantly when we come to look at 
reasons for not returning to Scotland. The most popular first preference 
reason is still work opportunities, but only 26% gave this as compared with 
47% who said it was their main reason for moving in the first place. Predictably 
'family and other social relations' become more important with 22% giving this 
as their reason for not returning to Scotland. People who may initially have no 
particular intention of staying, do marry, have children, become integrated 
into a social network and, as many commented, without consciously having 
made a decision not to return to Scotland, they find that the decision has just 
'happened'. Although they may still have strong family ties in Scotland, it is 
the primary family commitments in their adopted country which determines 
the choice. 'Lifestyle' also increases in popularity as a principal reason for not 
returning. Eighten per cent gave this as their reason, feeling that they now 
have a lifestyle which could not be reproduced in Scotland. Nine per cent gave 
money as a reason for not returning as opposed to 3% who gave it as a reason 
for going in the first place. So while economic reasons continue to be important 
in keeping people from returning to Scotland, they decline in importance 
relative to the socio/cultural reasons. 
The survey examined both feelings about returning to Scotland and the 
likelihood of this taking place. Thirty-four per cent had no interest in 
returning, while 16% expressed a positive desire to do so. The largest 
category, 50%, comprised those who still had some interest in returning but 
also reasons for remaining. When asked if they thought they would in fact 
return, 13% said yes without qualification; 13% said they might when they 
retired; and 34% said maybe. A realistic assessment is that there is some 
genuine potential for return migration, perhaps as much as 20% with a serious 
interest in returning while they are still economically active. But this will be 
dependent largely on the availability of appropriate employment for people 
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who are skilled and experienced and often in specialised jobs. 
These responses should not make us optimistic about successfully 
attracting many overseas migrants back and the expected increase in external 
demand for young, highly-skilled labour will put pressure on our capacity to 
hold more of the new generation. Can change in migration patterns take 
place? There is a striking case of migration reversal within Scotland which does 
show that history can be turned round. The one part of Scotland which 
embodied in the most dramatic and often poignant way the problems of out-
migration was the Highlands and Islands. It was the area in which migration 
loss was most highly visible and which had experienced substantial decline 
while Scotland as a whole was still undergoing slow population growth. 
Between 1921-61 the area lost almost a quarter of its population with 
consequent effects on its age structure. By 1961 the population had fallen to 
302,000 from a level of 424,000 in 1851. It was this alarming population decline 
in an area already very sparsely populated which more than any other factor 
led to the establishment of the Highlands and Islands Development Board. 
The Highlands and Islands are now experiencing a small positive gain from 
migration and this has been part of a steady, twenty-year turn-around. It is an 
exceptional reversal offortunes given the long-standing historical trends in the 
region and the fact that Scotland as a whole has not experienced this change in 
migration patterns. Nor is there one simple explanation like the oil industry 
since the reduction in migration loss had started before there was any major 
employment impact from oil development<14l. This is not to underestimate the 
significance of the oil factor but to put it in its place as one among a range of 
influences. Population levels started to stabilise after the mid-sixties and 
increased by 25,000 between 1971-81, largely through migration since natural 
increase was very small. Modest migration gains have continued throughout 
the 80's in Highland Region- 3,434 between 1981-87. In 1988 the Region 
gained over 1,000 from migration, about 25% from other parts of Scotland and 
the remainder from other parts of the UK, although some of these may be 
return migrants. Population increases have been widely spread(tS) and have 
taken place in most areas. 
This population increase has not come primarily from the stereotypical 
retired 'white settler' For example, the percentage of young people in the 
Highlands has increased. The 25-44 age group, having been below the Scottish 
average in 1961 and 1971, was slightly above it in 1981. The proportion of 
under-four year olds is now above the Scottish average. Oil played an 
important part in giving a boost to employment as three other large projects 
had done previously, Dounreay, British Aluminium and the Lochaber pulp 
mill. But the closure of two ofthese developments and the contraction of both 
Dounreay and oil-related development did not appear to reverse the progress 
towards both a modest increase in population and an improved age structure. 
The widespread nature of small migration-based population gains suggests 
that they did not rest only on a few large developments. It would appear that 
the reversal of historically high migration losses has arisen from a combination 
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of factors. Some economic expansion comes from a few large projects but also 
from investment in fishing, agriculture, tourism, infrastructure and some 
small-scale manufacturing. But since the region is not only holding people 
more effectively than Scotland as a whole but attracting modest numbers of 
people, we may have to look at environmental/lifestyle factors as part of the 
explanation. This may have significant implications for Scotland and highlight 
the positive advantages which have the potential both to keep and to attract 
people. 
While the Highlands and Islands offers a positive example of reversing 
migration loss, the country whose migration problem has historically been 
similar but even more serious, the Irish Republic, does not present an 
encouraging example. One in twenty of the population has left since 1982, and 
1988-9 saw a 46,000 loss< 16l. Despite the highest birth rate in Europe, its 
population has just gone into decline and it is estimated that like Scotland 
about 30% of its graduates migrate. This is despite considerable effort and 
some modest success in attracting inward investment. Unlike Scotland, the 
Irish Government does identify this as a serious social and economic problem 
and has tried to produce new policy initiatives to modify the migration 
problem. One project recently started is designed to encourage return 
migration by the highly skilled. It involves building up records of 'strategic 
workers' overseas and keeping them in contact with employment 
opportunities in Ireland. It will be interesting to see if there is any evidence of 
positive results from such a project. In Scotland's case we have seen from our 
graduate sample that there is a small proportion with a definite interest in 
returning and since this is a group into which expensive educational investment 
has gone, it may be worthwhile initiating a similar project. 
But while attracting return migration should not be dismissed as a 
hopeless proposition, it is not likely to be any more than a marginal factor. No 
matter what their original intention may have been, once people have gone 
there are strong reasons which keep them away. The important focus of any 
migration strategy must be on encouraging the skilled young to stay as their 
first preference. The positive factor in developing a feasible strategy is that we 
know the most migration-prone categories and can concentrate attention on 
them. The young who have recently completed some form of higher education 
are the people we most want to keep and are a readily identifiable and 
accessible group. But there has to be a positive prospectus for them and that 
above all means interesting job opportunities with good prospects for career 
development and for the exercise of responsibility and initiative. We also have 
to start selling Scotland's attractions and its future prospects to the young with 
as much effort as is used to sell Scotland to inward investors. To be convincing 
there has to be a product worth selling, a future that looks genuinely positive 
and attractive. 
Since constitutional change is on the Scottish horizon, what, if any, might 
the effect be on migratory behaviour? Any consideration of this has to be 
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speculative but if we assume that initially the effects on the economy of such 
change are neutral, the establishment of a Scottish Parliament ought to bring 
some decline in migration loss. The establishment of such a Parliament will 
bring with it a number of attractive and interesting jobs in administration, 
research and the media. It will also bring, as any legislature does, the offices of 
commercial and professional organisations, and interest groups. These are the 
kind of jobs attractive to ambitious young people. Since we have seen that one 
of the major reasons why many people leave is the non-economic one of 
adventure, experience, etc., the psychological dimension of constitutional 
change ought also to be a plus factor. Initially it will bring the optimism of fresh 
opportunity and the excitement of change. What the longer-term effect will be 
on migration will probably depend on the economic results of such change. If, 
as in the case of Ireland, the quality and quantity of job opportunities do not 
satisfy the aspirations of the young adults, then constitutional change will not 
reverse trends. If, on the other hand, it stimulates the supply of good quality 
jobs and the development of a more attractive physical and social 
environment, then we ought to expect some sustainable reduction in migration 
loss. 
Whatever efforts are made to reverse Scotland's migration loss, the 
realistic assumption is that these may not produce any major change but at best 
might stop further deterioration. Public policy will have to be developed on the 
assumption that population decline will continue. The more effective use of a 
declining labour supply is likely to make the education and training debate as 
central to the 90's as it was in the 60's. 
Isobel Lindsay, Sociology Division, Department of Government, Strathclyde 
University, Glasgow. 
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